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Article
A real-life example: A board of assessors meets to see a 
candidate present his research, and then, based on their 
observations, decide whether the candidate should be 
granted a “certificate of eligibility for tenure” (Habilitation, 
specific to the academic system in some European coun-
tries). The meeting is public, thus many people who are not 
members of the board—including one of the candidate’s 
close friends—are also part of the audience. After the talk, 
the candidate’s friend approaches some colleagues and 
praises the candidate’s performance: “Now, this is how it’s 
done!” and so on. It is obvious that he actually believes the 
candidate performed really well and must have impressed 
everybody in the room quite a bit. Praising the candidate’s 
performance for other reasons (e.g., to influence the deci-
sion that is about to be made) would make no sense for him 
because the people he talks to have nothing to do with the 
formal evaluation of the candidate. Notably, nobody agrees 
with him. Most people just nod politely to what he says and 
remain silent. Obviously, the other people in the room, who 
just saw the candidate for the very first time, agree that the 
candidate’s performance was actually quite horrible. How 
may such discrepant perceptions of the same person’s 
behavior be explained? May the personal relationship 
between the candidate and the friend have something to do 
with it?
According to West and Kenny’s (2011) Truth and Bias 
Model, the variables affecting all sorts of judgments, includ-
ing judgments of persons, can be categorized as either “truth” 
or “bias” variables. Truth variables represent what is “real” 
or “objectively correct” about a judgment, whereas bias vari-
ables represent any systematic influences apart from that. 
The extent to which a truth or bias variable affects judgments 
is called the “force” of that variable. In the present study, we 
investigate the relative extents to which self- and peer-
judgments of people’s behavior in specific situations are 
affected by how the target actually behaved (truth) and by the 
preexisting views that the perceivers had of the targets before 
observing their behavior (bias).
Truth in Judgments of Behavior
There are at least two distinct ways in which behavior may 
be described. On the one hand, one may focus on qualities of 
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The present study investigates the relative extent to which judgments of people’s behavior are influenced by “truth” (as 
measured by averaged observer-judgments) and by systematic bias (i.e., perceivers’ preexisting views of target persons). 
Using data from online questionnaires and laboratory sessions (N = 155), we demonstrate that self- and peer-judgments of 
people’s actual behavior in specific situations are somewhat accurate but are also affected by what perceivers thought of the 
targets before observing their behavior. The latter effect comprises a general evaluative component (generally positive or 
negative views of targets) and a content-specific component (views of targets in terms of specific characteristics, for example, 
“restrained”). We also found that friends, but not targets themselves, tend to judge targets’ behaviors more positively than 
unacquainted observers do. The relevance of these findings for person perception in everyday life and in research contexts 
is discussed.
Keywords
behavior, judgment, accuracy, evaluation, acquaintance
Received October 30, 2012; revision accepted September 8, 2013
154 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40(2)
behavior that are measurable with great exactness (e.g., 
whether person A decreases or increases her physical dis-
tance from person B). Such qualities of behavior may often 
be assessed without relying much on any subjective human 
judgments (e.g., by means of a ruler). The downside of such 
assessments is that their meaning is often psychologically 
ambiguous, and thus needs to be interpreted a posteriori by 
the researcher. In everyday life, on the other hand, people 
tend to describe their own and others’ behaviors by meaning-
laden terms like, for example, “friendly,” “hasty,” “hostile,” 
or “relaxed.” That is, they focus on the psychological rele-
vance of people’s behavior rather than on its physical quali-
ties. This latter kind of behavioral judgment is also the one 
that we are dealing with in the present article. However, 
determining whether a perceiver’s judgment of a target’s 
behavior by means of a meaning-laden term reflects the 
“truth” is less straightforward than in the first case.
It may be argued that the best way to assess whether 
some behavior is “actually” friendly, hasty, hostile, or 
relaxed is the average view that many neutral observers 
have of that behavior (cf. Kenny, 2004). Averaging different 
perceivers’ judgments of the same behavior reduces the 
impact of the individual perceivers’ idiosyncratic term uses 
and focuses on the common element instead. The existence of 
the latter constitutes the very reason why person-descriptive 
language may be effectively used at all. Moreover, averag-
ing judgments of behavior will yield an impression that is 
more representative of how a behavior will be perceived by 
the average other person. This in turn is important because 
how others interpret our behaviors will strongly determine 
the consequences of those behaviors (Leising & Müller-
Plath, 2009), so the “social reality” that only exists in other 
people’s minds at first (e.g., “the remark that Pete just made 
was really offensive”) may eventually have very real effects 
on the target person (e.g., Pete may be asked to leave). In 
accordance with this view, we define accuracy as the agree-
ment between a given perceiver’s judgment of a given 
behavior and the average judgment of the same behavior by 
several neutral observers. In terms of West and Kenny’s 
(2011) Truth and Bias model, the truth variable in our study 
is the average behavior judgment by several neutral observ-
ers, and the extent to which this variable predicts judgments 
of the same behavior by any other perceivers (e.g., targets 
or informants, see below) is the “force” of the truth 
variable.
Using such a definition, research has shown that indi-
viduals are in fact able to judge their own behavior within 
specific situations with some degree of accuracy (e.g., 
Leising, 2011; Sadler & Woody, 2003). In these studies, 
participants were asked to judge their own behavior during 
laboratory interactions, and these self-ratings did predict 
judgments of the same interactions by unacquainted observ-
ers. Therefore, we expect that in the present study, self-
judgments of behavior will converge at least somewhat 
with judgments by neutral observers. We also address the 
previously neglected question of whether the same is true 
for behavioral judgments that are provided by close 
acquaintances of the targets.
Preexisting Views as Biases in 
Judgments of Behavior
The systematic biases that we focus on in the present article 
concern perceivers’ preexisting views of the target persons 
whose behavior they judge. In terms of the Truth and Bias 
model, such preexisting views are bias variables that may 
affect behavioral judgments independent of the truth. There 
are at least two conceptually distinct ways in which such 
views may influence subsequent judgments of behavior, one 
of them being globally evaluative and the other being con-
tent-specific. In the first case, a perceiver may simply have 
an overall positive (or negative) attitude toward a target, and 
thus tend to use all sorts of positive (or negative) terms to 
describe that target’s behavior in a given situation, irrespec-
tive of how the target “actually” behaved. In the second case, 
a perceiver may have a content-specific view of a target (e.g., 
as being arrogant, witty, or aloof), and thus tend to judge that 
target’s behavior in a given situation accordingly, irrespec-
tive of how the target “actually” behaved.
Regarding global evaluation, there is a considerable varia-
tion in how positively or negatively people tend to view them-
selves and others (cf. Bono & Judge, 2003; Furr & Funder, 
1998; Kim, Schimmack, & Oishi, 2012; Leising, Erbs, & 
Fritz, 2010; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Saucier, 1994; 
Srivastava, Guglielmo, & Beer, 2010; Wood, Harms, & 
Vazire, 2010), and such different attitudes strongly predict 
whether perceivers will use positive or negative terms in 
characterizing targets (Leising et al., 2010; Leising, Ostrovski, 
& Zimmermann, 2013). Sometimes, a perceiver’s character-
ization of a target’s behavior in a given situation may even 
depend more on whether the perceiver is fond of the target or 
not than on how the target “actually” behaved. We are talking 
about partisanship here. Research in social psychology has 
demonstrated that perceptions of behavior may be strongly 
affected by a perceiver’s loyalty or allegiance regarding the 
target person: Studies of presidential debates in the United 
States showed that this factor predicted which candidate 
viewers would see as the winner (cf. Munro et al., 2002). In 
the present study, we expect that a perceiver who already 
holds a generalized positive image of a target person will see 
the subsequent behaviors of that target person in a more posi-
tive light, whereas a perceiver with a more negative attitude 
toward a target will do the opposite. We apply this logic to 
self- and peer-judgments of behavior alike.
Apart from global evaluation, a perceiver may think that a 
person’s behavior in a given situation was highly (for exam-
ple) sophisticated, friendly, or arrogant because he or she 
tended to think of the target as being sophisticated, friendly, 
or arrogant even before actually observing the behavior in 
question. Note that here it is the specific content of the word, 
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not its evaluative connotation, that matters. Let us consider, 
for example, a perceiver who is supposed to judge a known 
target’s “quickness” at a problem-solving task. Regardless of 
how positively or negatively the perceiver thinks of the tar-
get in general, if she is convinced that the target is usually 
“quick” at accomplishing things, she may tend to judge the 
quickness of the target’s problem solving in the situation 
accordingly, regardless of how quick the target actually was.
There is some evidence supporting the notion that people 
tend to characterize the behaviors of targets in line with pre-
existing images, and that to some extent, this happens inde-
pendent of the targets’ actual behaviors. For example, in the 
study by Sadler and Woody (2003), the participants tended to 
rate their own behavior during an interpersonal interaction in 
accordance with their general self-views, even if their “actual” 
behavior during the interaction (as consensually judged by 
several observers) was controlled for. In other words, the par-
ticipants overestimated the extent to which their behavior in 
the situation concurred with what they generally thought of 
themselves. Sadler and Woody (2003) called this phenome-
non a “consistency bias” (cf. Leising, 2011).
In the present article, we will use the term preexisting 
views (PEV) to denote the images of the targets that already 
existed in the perceivers’ minds before they engage in the 
task of judging the targets’ behavior in specific situations. An 
important limitation of the aforementioned studies is that 
they did not distinguish between preexisting views that are 
globally evaluative and preexisting views that are content-
specific. Thus, for example, a given perceiver’s judging a 
target’s personality and behavior as “witty” may have been 
due to the specific content of the term or simply due to the 
fact that the term has a positive evaluative connotation. In the 
present study, we disentangle these two possibilities from 
one another by separately investigating the influences of pre-
existing views that are globally evaluative (PEV-GE) and 
preexisting views that are content-specific (PEV-CS).
Moreover, we also disentangle two components of behav-
ioral judgments that were not disentangled in previous stud-
ies of the “consistency bias”: Preexisting views of targets 
may affect subsequent judgments of those targets’ behaviors 
because (a) perceivers judge particular targets in certain 
ways and/or because (b) perceivers tend to judge all targets 
in certain ways. In Kenny’s (1994) terminology, the former 
would be denoted as “relationship effects,” whereas the latter 
would be denoted as “perceiver effects.” We investigate how 
strongly both components contribute to the consistency 
between preexisting views and subsequent judgments of 
behavior.
Furthermore, in the studies described above the interval 
between the global self-assessment of personality and the 
momentary self-assessment of situated behavior was very 
short (less than an hour). It is thus conceivable that the influ-
ence of the perceivers’ preexisting views was overestimated 
because the participants’ general images of themselves were 
made salient shortly before they were asked to judge their 
own behavior (Leising, 2011), or the personality assessment 
took place shortly after the participants had judged their 
own behavior (Sadler & Woody, 2003). In the present study, 
we use much longer intervals between the two kinds of 
assessment in order to rule out this alternative explanation. 
Finally, our study extends the previous work by testing 
whether the preexisting views affect not only self- but also 
peer-judgments of behavior.
Possible Mechanisms
Even though we do not directly address psychological mecha-
nisms in the present article, we think it should still be asked 
why one may expect effects of perceivers’ preexisting views 
of targets on those perceivers’ subsequent judgments of the 
same targets’ behaviors. Would it not be more reasonable for 
a perceiver to form as accurate an impression of the target’s 
behavior as possible and not rely on any other source of infor-
mation than “what is actually there” (truth)? A large number 
of studies have demonstrated that people tend to interpret new 
information in accordance with their preexisting beliefs or 
expectations (see Nickerson, 1998, for a review). This phe-
nomenon has often been attributed to motivational factors 
such as a basic need to maintain cognitive congruence 
(Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998). It may be 
argued that such congruence is needed because only congru-
ent views permit predictions of future events. With regard to 
behavior perception, this would imply that once a perceiver 
has formed a certain view of a target person, he or she may be 
inclined to actively seek or prioritize novel information that 
concurs with this view. In fact, research has shown that once 
individuals have developed some belief about another person 
(e.g. “the person is friendly”), they selectively seek behav-
ioral evidence that confirms rather than falsifies this belief 
(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984; Snyder & Campbell, 1980; 
Snyder & Swann, 1978).
Another possible explanation is more informational in 
nature. For a perceiver who has access to several sources of 
information about a target (e.g., observations of the target’s 
behavior in several situations), it may be wise to pool that 
information in order to form the most accurate impression of 
the target possible. The upside of doing so would be that the 
resulting image of the person would likely become more rep-
resentative of how the person is on average, possibly permit-
ting more accurate predictions of the target’s behavior in the 
long run. Thus, if the target’s behavior in a new situation 
deviates from what the perceiver has previously learned 
about the person, the new information may be partially dis-
counted as an “exception,” and the interpretation of the new 
behavior may be “colored” by the perceiver’s previous expe-
riences with the target. The downside of doing so, however, 
would be that the perceiver’s ability to judge the target’s 
behavior in just one situation objectively may at least partly 
be compromised. The present study investigates the extent to 
which this is the case.
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Overview of the Present Study
Given the ubiquity and importance of self- and peer-judg-
ments of behavior in everyday life as well as in psychologi-
cal research, it seems worthwhile to examine the factors that 
contribute to the formation of such judgments. In the present 
study, we use a design that allows us to simultaneously 
investigate the influence of truth and bias (i.e., perceivers’ 
preexisting view of targets) on self- and peer-judgments of 
behavior. In order to maximize external validity (cf. 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007), we do not use written 
vignettes of people’s behavior (which was the predominant 
method in previous studies addressing similar issues) but 
rather investigate judgments of people’s actual behaviors. 
Specifically, we invite target persons and their peers to the 
laboratory and then videotape the targets’ behaviors in a vari-
ety of standardized situations. Afterward, the targets and 
their peers judge the targets’ behaviors. In order to obtain an 
accuracy criterion, the same behaviors are also judged by 
unacquainted observers. The general images that the targets 
and their peers have of the targets’ personalities are assessed 
by means of online questionnaires several days prior to the 
laboratory assessments. The design enables us to compare 
the relative influence of the truth (= averaged observer-judg-
ments), as compared to PEV-GE and PEV-CS, on the partici-
pants’ judgments of their own and their peers’ behaviors.
Method
Sample
The main sample comprised two groups of participants, the 
target persons (N = 155) and the informants (N = 155), who 
came to the lab together in dyads (see below). Each partici-
pant (i.e., target or informant) received 15 Euros as a reward 
for participating. One hundred and fifty target persons com-
pleted the online questionnaire. Of these, 86 were female, 63 
were male, and 1 did not report sex. The mean age of the 
targets was 23.2 years (SD = 4.06). Of the informants, 153 
completed the online questionnaire. Of these, 93 were 
female, 59 were male, and 1 did not report sex. The mean age 
of the informants was 23.8 years (SD = 4.44). The majority 
(n = 85) of the informants were friends of the targets’. 
Another large proportion of the informants were the targets’ 
romantic partners (n = 53). Other kinds of relationships 
between informants and partners (e.g., colleagues, siblings) 
were less frequent (n < 10). The informants reported know-
ing the targets quite well (M = 4.17, SD = 0.79, on a scale 
ranging from 1 [“not at all”] to 5 [“very well”]) and liking 
them very much (M = 4.70, SD = 0.51, on a scale ranging 
from 1 [“not at all”] to 5 [“very much”]). The values for the 
targets’ knowing and liking of the informants were virtually 
identical (Knowing: M = 4.21, SD = 0.73; Liking: M = 4.67, 
SD = 0.55), which is unsurprising given that the roles of tar-
get and informant were assigned at random (see below).
Procedure
Recruitment. We advertised the study on a campus website 
and in local community centers. The announcement of the 
study contained an e-mail address to which participants were 
asked to write in order to register for the study. When pro-
spective participants contacted the research team, they 
received an e-mail containing some broad information 
regarding the aims and procedures of the study. The e-mail 
also asked the participants to recruit a second person who 
knew them reasonably well and would also be willing to take 
part in the study. When a prospective participant contacted 
the research team again and named a second person who had 
agreed to participate, we randomly determined which of the 
two persons would serve as the target and which would serve 
as the informant. In the following, we will call these target-
informant pairs dyads.
Personality questionnaires. Both the target and the informant 
of a dyad received an e-mail containing a link to an online 
questionnaire. They were asked to log in and describe the 
target person’s personality by means of an adjective list (see 
below). We emphasized that the two persons should com-
plete the questionnaire independently and that they should 
not communicate with each other about their ratings. The 
online questionnaire also contained a number of questions 
regarding the two participants’ personal backgrounds (e.g., 
socioeconomic status) and their relationship with each other 
(e.g., knowing and liking).
Laboratory session. A few days later, the target and the infor-
mant were invited to come to the lab together for a series of 
observational assessments. These assessments all took place 
on the same day and comprised three stages. In the first stage, 
the target person engaged in four tasks, which were presented 
in random order. Task 1 consisted of answering a number of 
questions pertaining to general knowledge (e.g., “How high 
is Mount Everest?” “How many people live in the Tokyo 
area?” “Who wrote the opera ‘Fidelio’?”). Task 2 consisted 
of a role-play in which the target person was to call a “neigh-
bor” (actually played by a confederate) and to demand that 
the neighbor turns down the volume on her stereo (cf. Borke-
nau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004). In Task 
3, the target person was asked to spontaneously tell a brief 
story incorporating the terms “Corkscrew,” “Holiday,” 
“Catastrophe,” and “Glove Box.” In Task 4, the target person 
was asked to (a) sing a song of his or her own choice, (b) tell 
a joke of his or her own choice, and (c) pantomime the term 
party (which in German does not also mean “political party” 
but only “festivity”). The four tasks were selected to enable 
an assessment of diverse qualities of behavior. Completing a 
task usually took a target less than 90 s. The targets’ behavior 
while engaging in the tasks was videotaped. While the target 
of a given dyad completed the four tasks, the respective 
informant was seated in another room and asked to wait.
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In the second stage of the laboratory session, the target and 
the informant each rated four video-clips, by means of the 
same adjective list that was also used for the personality 
assessments (see below). These video-ratings took place in 
separate rooms. One member of the dyad (the target or the 
informant) rated the video-clips that had just been produced—
the ones showing the current target engage in the four tasks. 
The tasks were presented in the same order in which the target 
had completed them. Meanwhile, the other member of the 
dyad watched four video-clips showing the target of the pre-
vious dyad (i.e., an unknown person) engage in the same 
tasks. Both the target and the informant of the current dyad 
were asked to watch one of the respective video-clips that had 
been assigned to them, then rate the respective target’s behav-
ior by means of the adjectives, then watch the next video-clip, 
and so on. Whether the informant watched the current target 
and the current target watched the previous target, or vice 
versa, was also determined at random.
In the third stage of the laboratory session, the previous 
rating assignments were reversed: If the informant had just 
rated the current target, and the current target had just rated 
the previous target, then the informant was now supposed to 
rate the previous target, whereas the current target was sup-
posed to rate himself or herself. If the rating assignments in 
the second stage had been the other way round, then the 
assignments in the third stage were reversed accordingly. 
This way, we let both the informants and the targets judge (a) 
targets they knew and (b) targets they did not know.
External observers’ ratings. Each of the 620 video-clips (= 155 
targets × 4 tasks) was also independently rated by at least 
three observers who were unacquainted with the targets (the 
maximum number of observers per video was six). The over-
all pool of observers comprised 18 persons from which sub-
groups were selected randomly to judge the individual 
video-clips. The ratings were balanced such that each observer 
would get to see all targets but only see each target in one 
randomly chosen situation. Hence, the observer-ratings 
always reflected judgments by persons who saw the respec-
tive target in just one situation. The observers did not receive 
any training (apart from general technical instructions on how 
to watch the videos and provide their ratings) in order to pre-
serve the representativeness of their intuitive ways of apply-
ing the adjectives to the target persons’ behaviors.
Measure
The adjective list that we employed for the ratings of the tar-
gets’ personalities and behavior in the lab was devised by 
Borkenau and Ostendorf (1998) and has been used in several 
person perception studies (e.g., Leising et al., 2010; Leising et 
al., 2013). It consists of 30 terms that assess the Big Five per-
sonality factors by six items each. Three terms for each factor 
have a positive valence and three have a negative valence. We 
let the participants use the same terms for assessing the targets’ 
more stable behavioral dispositions (in the online personality 
questionnaire) and their more transient situation-bound behav-
iors (in the lab). This conforms to the personality states 
approach, which posits that both traits and states may be 
assessed by means of the same vocabulary (Fleeson, 2001; 
Bleidorn, 2009). For example, in the online questionnaire, the 
targets and their informants rated how “shy” or “egoistic” they 
considered the targets to be in general, whereas in the lab ses-
sion, they rated how “shy” or “egoistic” they considered the 
targets’ behavior during the tasks to be. However, because fac-
tor structures of measures may differ considerably depending 
on whether a measure is used for assessing states versus traits 
(e.g., Leising & Bleidorn, 2011), we only report analyses at 
the level of individual items in the following. This is also the 
level of abstraction at which everyday communication about 
individual differences in personality and behavior takes place. 
The intervals between the completion of the online question-
naire and the laboratory assessments had an average length of 
M = 4.08 days (SD = 3.24) for the targets and of M = 4.43 days 
(SD = 4.37) for the informants.
Each of the 30 adjectives was also rated in terms of how 
positive or negative an impression of a target person it evokes 
(i.e., social desirability). For this, we used the ratings that 
were provided by 24 student raters as part of the study by 
Leising et al. (2010). The scale ranged from 1 (very negative) 
to 7 (very positive). Interrater reliability for these ratings was 
ICC(3, 24) = .98. The desirability ratings were needed to 
compute global evaluation indices by correlating a perceiv-
er’s ratings of a target on the 30 items with the profile of item 
desirabilities (Edwards, 1953). The resulting correlations 
reflect the extent to which the perceiver describes the target 
in a more positive or negative manner overall.
Results
Agreement Between the Observers
We used averaged observer-ratings as a measure of the tar-
gets’ “true” behaviors during the laboratory tasks. The aver-
age interrater agreement, ICC(1, 3), between three observers 
in judging the targets’ behavior by means of a single item 
was .45 (SD = 0.15) for the story task, .47 (SD = 0.19) for the 
pantomime task, .44 (SD = 0.18) for the role-play task, and 
.49 (SD = 0.11) for the knowledge task. These levels of inter-
rater agreement are comparable to the levels of agreement 
that were obtained in previous studies (e.g., Borkenau et al., 
2004) and can be regarded as quite satisfactory. Note that 
they reflect lower-bound estimates for interrater agreement 
because the performances of most targets in most situations 
were judged by more than three observers.
Correlations Among the Predictors
In West and Kenny’s (2011) Truth and Bias Model, the truth 
and bias variables may or may not be correlated with one 
158 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40(2)
another. In our sample, all correlations between the three pre-
dictors (averaged across items) were statistically significant 
as indicated by 99% bootstrap confidence intervals that did 
not include zero. The targets’ self-ratings on an individual 
questionnaire item (PEV-CS) predicted the observers’ ratings 
of the targets’ behavior on the same item (truth) at r = .14 on 
average. The respective correlation for the informants’ ratings 
of the targets’ personalities was r = .11. Thus, the targets’ and 
the informants’ item-specific views of the targets’ personali-
ties had some validity, in that they could predict independent 
ratings of the targets’ behaviors in the lab later on.
Before computing the average correlation of PEV-GE 
with PEV-CS and with the observer-ratings of the targets’ 
behavior, PEV-GE had to be inverted (i.e., multiplied with 
−1) in all cases where it was correlated with an item that had 
a negative valence (i.e., an average desirability rating < 4). 
Otherwise, the correlations of PEV-GE with positive and 
negative items might have canceled out when averaging 
across items. After implementing this rule, the average cor-
relation between PEV-GE and PEV-CS was .28 for the tar-
gets’ self-ratings and .34 for the informant-ratings, suggesting 
that targets who received more positive overall personality 
ratings were also judged more positively on individual items. 
The averaged observer-ratings of the targets’ behavior (truth) 
correlated at .06 (on average) with PEV-GE in the targets’ 
self-ratings of their personalities and also at .06 with PEV-GE 
in the respective informant-ratings. Thus, targets who had 
received more positive overall personality ratings were also 
judged in a slightly more positive manner by the average 
observer, on individual items.
Relative Influence of Truth and Bias on 
Judgments of the Behavior of Known Targets
Using multiple regressions, we predicted the participants’ 
(i.e., the targets’ and the informants’) judgments of the tar-
gets’ behavior in the lab from (a) averaged observer-judg-
ments of the same behavior (truth), (b) the same perceivers’ 
preexisting views of the targets in terms of particular items 
(PEV-CS), and (c) the same perceivers’ preexisting global 
evaluations of the targets (PEV-GE). For these analyses, we 
used the targets’ and the informants’ ratings of persons they 
knew (i.e., the current targets) because without prior acquain-
tance between target and perceiver, behavior judgments 
could not be affected by the latter two factors. Note that by 
using multiple regressions, we determined the independent 
contributions of each predictor, controlling for the other two 
predictors.
Table 1 displays the average Betas that emerged for the 
three predictors, along with 99% confidence intervals that 
were determined by bootstrapping with the 30 items as cases. 
To arrive at these correlations, we first ran multiple regres-
sions for each item and task separately (= 120 regressions), 
then averaged the resulting coefficients across tasks for each 
item (distinguishing between tasks did not lead to any differ-
ent conclusions), and then averaged across the 30 items. In 
computing average Betas for PEV-GE, we again reversed the 
direction of the predictor for all items with a negative 
valence. Otherwise, positive and negative associations might 
have canceled out. In fact, when not inverting PEV-GE in 
predictions of negative items, the average standardized Betas 
for the individual items correlated at r(28) = .94 (targets) and 
r(28) = .87 (informants) with the items’ social desirability 
ratings. Thus, the more an item entailed a positive or nega-
tive evaluation, the better the perceivers’ ratings of the tar-
gets’ behavior by means of that item could be predicted from 
the same perceivers’ preexisting global evaluations of the 
targets (PEV-GE).
In our discussion of the average contributions of the three 
predictors, we will concentrate on the standardized Betas 
that are displayed in the second and third data column of 
Table 1. As can be seen from the entries in the second data 
column, all three predictors made significant contributions in 
predicting the targets’ and the informants’ judgments of the 
targets’ behavior: The targets’ actual behavior (truth)—as 
judged by unacquainted observers—and the perceivers’ 
Table 1. Prediction of the Targets’ and the Informants’ Behavior Ratings From the Truth and the Two Bias Variables.
Criterion Predictor
Standardized Betas
Without 
perceiver effectsBetas Raw
Behavior rating by target Truth .22 (.16, .28) .14 (.10, .18) .17 (.13, .21)
 PEV-CS bias .18 (.14, .22) .17 (.13, .21) .13 (.10, .15)
 PEV-GE bias .28 (.21, .35) .09 (.06, .11) .03 (.00, .05)
Behavior rating by 
informant
  
Truth .31 (.23, .38) .18 (.13, .23) .18 (.15, .22)
PEV-CS bias .21 (.17, .25) .19 (.15, .23) .08 (.05, .11)
PEV-GE bias .22 (.13, .30) .08 (.04, .10) .04 (.02, .06)
Note. Coefficients were first computed for each task and item separately and then averaged (99% bootstrap confidence intervals are in parentheses). 
Truth = averaged observer-ratings of the targets’ behavior, PEV-CS = Perceivers’ preexisting views of targets (content-specific) as measured by the 
perceivers’ response to the same item in the personality questionnaire. PEV-GE = Perceivers’ preexisting views of targets (global evaluation) as measured 
by the correlation between the perceiver’s description of the target in the personality questionnaire and the social desirabilities of the 30 items. PEV-GE 
was multiplied with minus 1 when predicting behavior ratings on items with a negative valence (average desirability rating < 4).
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content-specific preexisting views of the targets (PEV-CS) 
both made significant contributions of approximately the 
same size. In addition, the perceivers’ globally evaluative 
views of the targets (PEV-GE) made another significant, but 
somewhat smaller, contribution of their own. The relative 
strengths of the three effects were approximately the same 
for self- and informant-ratings of behavior.
We also controlled for perceiver effects in order to deter-
mine how much of the influence of the two bias variables 
was due to general perceptual tendencies as opposed to the 
perceivers’ views of the particular targets at hand. In the 
present study, a perceiver’s perceiver-effect was obtained by 
averaging his or her judgments of the behavior of the known 
target (i.e., himself or herself or the other person in his or her 
dyad) and the unknown target (i.e., the target of the previous 
dyad). Perceiver-effects were calculated separately for each 
of the 30 items and subtracted from the participants’ ratings 
of the targets’ behavior (i.e., the DV) before repeating the 
item-wise multiple regressions described above. The results 
are displayed in the third data column of Table 1: Controlling 
for perceiver effects did not change the effect size for the 
truth variable (i.e., observer-ratings of the targets’ behav-
ior). It did, however, significantly reduce the influence of the 
perceivers’ global evaluations of the targets (PEV-GE) on 
both self- and informant-ratings of behavior. Thus, a substan-
tial proportion of the above-reported effect of this predictor 
was due to perceiver effects. For self-ratings, the respective 
confidence interval almost included zero (the lower confi-
dence limit was minimally larger than zero, which is obscured 
in the table because of rounding). Finally, controlling for per-
ceiver effects also lowered the impact of PEV-CS on behav-
ior judgments, with the decrease being considerably stronger 
for the informants’ (compared to the targets’) judgments of 
the targets’ behavior.
Loss of Validity Due to Target-Perceiver 
Relationship?
Given that the perceiver’s preexisting views of the targets 
were found to affect their subsequent judgments of the tar-
gets’ behavior, we investigated whether the accuracy of judg-
ments of known targets was lower than the accuracy of 
judgments of unknown targets. To this aim, we compared the 
accuracy of four kinds of judgments with each other: (a) The 
targets’ judgments of their own behavior, (b) the informants’ 
judgments of the behavior of “their” targets, (c) the targets’ 
judgments of the behavior of the previous targets, and (d) the 
informants’ judgments of the behavior of the previous tar-
gets. Thus, we compared the accuracy of perceivers who 
judged targets they already knew (a, b) with the accuracy of 
perceivers who judged targets they did not know (c, d). In all 
four cases, accuracy was defined as the agreement between 
the respective kind of judgment (a, b, c, d) and the average 
observer-judgment of the same behavior. If acquaintance 
with a target impairs validity, then accuracy should be lower 
for “a” and “b” as compared to “c” and “d.”
First, we computed the correlations between each of the 
four perspectives and the averaged observer-ratings sepa-
rately for each task and item. Then we averaged across tasks. 
Across the 30 items, the mean correlation was r = .18 (99% 
bootstrap CI = [.13, .22]) for the current targets’ ratings of 
their own behavior (a), r = .22 (CI = [.17, .27]) for the current 
informants’ ratings of the current targets’ behavior (b), r = 
.26 (CI = [.22, .30]) for the current targets’ ratings of the 
previous targets’ behavior (c), and r = .21 (CI = [.16, .26]) for 
the current informants’ ratings of the previous targets’ behav-
ior (d). Confidence intervals revealed that only the greatest 
difference (.18 vs. .26) was significant, suggesting that the 
accuracy of the targets’ judgments was greater when they 
judged someone else’s behavior as compared to when they 
judged their own behavior.
Global Evaluation Across Different Assessments
Finally, we compared how positively or negatively partici-
pants’ personalities and behaviors were judged by the dif-
ferent types of perceivers. In each case, a perceiver’s overall 
evaluation of a target was measured in terms of the within-
person correlation between the perceiver’s description of 
the target across the 30 adjectives and the social desirability 
ratings for these adjectives. Thus, a positive correlation was 
indicative of positive global evaluation. Note that global 
evaluation coefficients were computed for the participants’ 
judgments of the targets’ personalities by means of the 
online questionnaire (= PEV-GE) as well as for their judg-
ments of the targets’ behavior in the lab. Each target’s 
behavior in the lab was rated by one previously acquainted 
target (i.e., the target’s self-rating) and one previously 
acquainted informant, as well as by one unacquainted target 
and one unacquainted informant. In addition, there were 
three to six observer-ratings of each target’s behavior. In 
order to ensure comparability between perspectives, we 
first computed a global evaluation index for each individual 
observer and then averaged across observers. For behavior 
ratings, evaluation indices were first computed separately 
for each task and then averaged across tasks.
The average global evaluation indices were r = .58 (range 
= −.14 to .92) for the targets’ self-descriptions and r = .68 
(range = .05 to .93) for the informants’ descriptions of “their” 
targets’ personalities in the online questionnaire. The targets’ 
average evaluation was r = .43 (range = −.62 to .88) for their 
own behavior in the lab and r = .45 (range = −.36 to .89) for 
other targets’ behavior. The informants’ average evaluation 
was r = .54 (range = −.48 to .93) for their “own” targets’ 
behavior in the lab and r = .40 (range = −.41 to .88) for other 
targets’ behavior. Finally, the average evaluation of the tar-
gets’ behavior in the lab by a single neutral observer was r = 
.41 (range = −.31 to .77).
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We first compared the evaluation coefficients for the five 
different kinds of judgments of the targets’ behavior in the 
lab with one another, using one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA. The comparison was statistically significant, F(4, 
147) = 12.274, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple testing (α = .01) sug-
gested that the informants’ judgments of their own targets’ 
behavior were significantly more positive than all other 
behavior judgments but that none of the other behavior judg-
ments differed from each other in terms of global evaluation. 
In a second analysis, we compared the evaluation coeffi-
cients for the targets’ versus the informants’ judgments 
(Factor 1) and for questionnaire versus behavior ratings 
(Factor 2) with one another, using two-way repeated mea-
sures ANOVA. Note that in this analysis, we only used judg-
ments within the same dyads, that is, judgments of known 
targets. The analysis yielded significant effects for both fac-
tors, target-informant, F(1, 146) = 29.009, p < .001; behav-
ior-personality, F(1, 146) = 94.784, p < .001; but no 
significant interaction effect, F(1, 146) = 0.215, p = .643. 
Hence, informants viewed targets more positively than tar-
gets viewed themselves, and for both targets and observers, 
ratings of overall personality were more positive than ratings 
of behavior in the lab.
Discussion
Truth and Bias in Judgments of Behavior
The current study aimed to investigate the relative extents to 
which self- and informant-ratings of targets’ behavior in spe-
cific situations reflect “the truth,” as opposed to two different 
kinds of bias (i.e., PEV-GE and PEV-CS). Taken together, we 
found that the truth and both bias variables had significant and 
independent effects on self- and informant-ratings of behavior. 
To some extent, such ratings reflect (a) the views that external 
observers would have of the same behaviors (truth), (b) the 
generally positive or negative views that the perceivers had of 
the targets before observing their behaviors (PEV-GE), and (c) 
the views that the perceivers had of the targets before observ-
ing their behaviors in terms of specific judgment dimensions 
(e.g., “restrained”; PEV-CS). The “forces” of the truth and 
PEV-CS variables were about equally strong and stronger than 
the force of the PEV-GE variable.
With regard to truth, we found that self- and informant-
ratings of behavior moderately agreed with average judg-
ments of the same behavior by three or more observers. This 
largely confirms the findings of previous studies (Leising, 
2011; Sadler & Woody, 2003) and implies that momentary 
self- and informant-ratings of behavior do in fact concur to 
some extent with how the same behavior would be inter-
preted by persons who see the target person for the first time. 
If one accepts averaged behavior ratings by several neutral 
observers as a valid measure of the behavior’s “true” mean-
ing, then this finding supports the notion that self- and 
informant-ratings of a person’s behavior are at least partly 
accurate or valid.
Apart from that, however, the present article also demon-
strates that people’s judgments of the behavior of targets they 
know are affected by two different kinds of bias: evaluative 
and content-specific preexisting views of a person. The for-
mer bias closely resembles the effect of partisanship on judg-
ments of candidates’ performances in presidential debates 
(cf. Munro et al., 2002). However, the findings of the present 
study pertain more directly to everyday interpersonal rela-
tionships: Preexisting positive or negative attitudes do not 
only affect people’s judgments of the debate performances of 
presidential candidates they (dis-)like, they also affect peo-
ple’s judgments of their own behavior, and of the behavior of 
their close acquaintances, across diverse situations.
Notably, the strength of the PEV-GE bias is strongly mod-
erated by the evaluative connotation of the item that is used 
to describe the behavior. The more evaluative the item is, the 
larger the (positive or negative) impact of the perceiver’s 
global evaluation of the target will be (cf. Leising & 
Borkenau, 2011). The present study is already the third to 
empirically corroborate this interaction between perceivers’ 
global evaluations of targets (sometimes assessed as “lik-
ing”) and the evaluativeness of person descriptors (cf. 
Leising et al., 2010; Leising et al., 2013). In fact, the correla-
tions that we found between the Betas for PEV-GE and the 
item desirability ratings were so high (r > .86) that it may be 
reasonable to interpret the latter as directly reflecting the 
extent to which items will respond to a perceiver’s more pos-
itive or negative attitude toward a target. This renders it 
likely that controlling for item desirability may be an effec-
tive way of addressing socially (un-) desirable responding 
(cf. Paulhus, 2002), that is, individual differences between 
perceivers in terms of their judging (all or particular) targets 
too positively or too negatively. Future research needs to 
address this highly intriguing possibility.
The other kind of bias that independently affects behavior 
judgments is content-specific: If a perceiver has come to 
generally attribute some level of a particular characteristic to 
a target person, then his or her judgments of that target’s sub-
sequent behavior in specific situations will partly reflect this 
general view, even when controlling for the target’s “actual” 
behavior in the situation. This finding clearly stands in line 
with the previous research (cf. Leising, 2011; Sadler & 
Woody, 2003). Going beyond previous findings, however, 
the present study demonstrates that this bias effect still holds 
if one controls for general evaluation. It is also the first study 
to show that informant-ratings of behavior are just as suscep-
tible to this bias as are self-ratings. Moreover, our study dem-
onstrates that a substantial proportion of the effect of PEV-CS 
is target-specific and cannot merely be explained in terms of 
perceivers’ general judgment tendencies (cf. Kenny, 1994). 
Finally, the present study demonstrates that the effect occurs 
even if the interval between the assessment of the perceiver’s 
general image of the target and same perceiver’s judgment of 
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the same target’s behavior in a particular situation is several 
days long (about 4 days on average). Therefore, it appears 
highly unlikely that the effect is merely rooted in the research-
ers’ making the perceivers’ general images of the targets 
salient shortly before the behavioral assessment takes place. 
An explanation in terms of motivational or informational 
mechanisms (see above) seems more viable. Future research 
should compare the validities of such theoretical explana-
tions with one another.
Loss of Validity Due to Acquaintance Between 
Target and Perceiver?
We also investigated whether judgments of the behavior of 
known targets are less accurate than judgments of the behav-
ior of unknown targets. Using averaged observer-ratings as 
an accuracy criterion, we found that the targets were in fact 
systematically less accurate in judging their own behavior as 
compared to how accurate they were in judging the behavior 
of other people they did not know. However, it may not be 
concluded that self-judgments of behavior are generally less 
accurate than are other-ratings because we did not find sig-
nificant differences in accuracy between self-ratings and 
informant-ratings of behavior. Also, the informants were 
about equally accurate in judging the behavior of known tar-
gets and unknown targets. Therefore, the present study does 
not suggest that prior acquaintance between perceivers and 
targets is always detrimental to the perceivers’ accuracy in 
judging the targets’ behavior. According to our view, the 
finding that the targets were more accurate in judging some-
one else than in judging themselves may be attributed to the 
operation of self-protective mechanisms in self-judgments 
(e.g., Tice, 1991) as opposed to the targets’ heightened atten-
tion to someone else’s performance in the same situations 
that they had just undergone themselves.
It should be noted, however, that the targets and the infor-
mants in the present study judged the targets’ behavior 
directly after seeing them on video. This probably made it 
relatively easy for them to be accurate because they received 
the exact same behavioral information on which the observ-
ers also based their judgments. The fact that, even under such 
optimal conditions for accuracy, we still found significant 
effects for our bias variables (see above) renders these effects 
even more impressive. We suspect that, under conditions 
where the interval between the observation and the judgment 
of behavior is larger, the impact of the perceivers’ preexisting 
views of the targets on their judgments of the targets’ behav-
ior might become even stronger and possibly come to impair 
accuracy. This issue needs to be addressed by future research.
Global Evaluation Across Perspectives
We also investigated mean differences in how positively or 
negatively the targets’ behaviors and personalities were 
described across the various assessments. First, we found 
that the informants’ judgments of “their” targets’ behavior in 
the lab were more positive than any other judgments of that 
behavior. This clearly supports the notion of a “pal-serving 
bias” (Leising et al., 2010), that is, partisanship in judgments 
of the behavior of others we know and like. It should be 
noted that this finding concerns a main effect (people in gen-
eral are partisan to their friends), whereas the above-
described effects of PEV-GE concern individual differences 
(people who generally see their targets more positively will 
describe those targets’ subsequent behaviors more posi-
tively). It should also be noted that we did not find evidence 
for a general self-serving bias in judgments of behavior. One 
possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that prais-
ing others is less “taboo” than praising oneself (cf. Gallrein, 
Carlson, Holstein, & Leising, 2013).
Second, we found that judgments of personality were 
more positive than judgments of behavior in the lab. This 
may be explained by our tasks eliciting behaviors that were 
actually less “positive” than the behaviors that most people 
tend to show in their everyday lives (the latter constituting 
the basis for personality judgments). Alternatively, it may be 
the case that judgments of behavior from video are more 
data-driven than broad retrospective judgments of personal-
ity in a questionnaire. Because the latter kind of judgment is 
more abstract, it may permit more target-serving, selective 
recall of relevant behavioral episodes.
Broader Implications and Outlook
Which implications do the present results have for behav-
ioral assessment in general? Most importantly, they suggest 
that, apart from “truth,” momentary self- and other-judg-
ments of behavior reflect a substantial proportion of system-
atic bias variance. If a target’s behavior is judged by someone 
who is previously acquainted with the target, the resulting 
judgments will partly reflect the perceiver’s preexisting view 
of the target, both in terms of general evaluation and in terms 
of the specific judgment dimension at hand. In other words, 
if we know how a perceiver generally views a target, we will 
be able to partly predict that perceiver’s judgments of that 
target’s subsequent behaviors, irrespective of how the target 
actually behaves. This might explain some of the stunning 
discrepancies that sometimes exist between different per-
ceivers’ views on the same targets’ behaviors (e.g., in our 
introductory real-life example).
The bias effects that we found may become a problem 
especially when multiple momentary assessments of behav-
ior are averaged (as is often the case in experience sampling 
studies). For example, if we assume that people’s self-images 
are relatively stable over time, they might be expected to 
affect all momentary self-assessments of behavior in a simi-
lar manner. In contrast, the targets’ actual behaviors in the 
different situations may contribute less to the average of 
momentary self-assessments, to the extent that they vary 
over time. Taken to the extreme, it would be conceivable that 
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an average of many momentary self-assessments may only 
reflect the target’s overall self-images, but none of the tar-
get’s actual behaviors in specific situations anymore, because 
the latter have averaged out. In such a case, the momentary 
assessments would become superfluous because a single 
overall self-assessment would do the job (of assessing what 
people think of themselves) just as well. As the current study 
shows, using informant-instead of self-judgments of behav-
ior would not be a solution to this problem because infor-
mant-judgments are just as prone to being biased by 
preexisting views as are self-judgments. The question of how 
much incremental validity (e.g., in predicting important out-
comes) aggregated momentary self- or informant-judgments 
of behavior actually have beyond the respective perceivers’ 
general images of the targets remains to be answered by 
future research.
The present study also shows that people tend to judge the 
behavior of their friends, but not their own behavior, in 
overly positive ways. It seems appropriate to use the term 
overly here because we could show that these judgments 
were significantly more positive than judgments of the very 
same behaviors, by means of the very same terms, by any-
body else, including neutral observers. The finding is in line 
with previous research showing that people tend to view 
their close acquaintances more positively than they view 
themselves (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2009; Leising et al., 2010; 
McNulty, O’Mara, & Karney, 2008; Murray, 1999; Murray, 
Holmes, & Griffin, 1996; Swami, Stieger, Haubner, Voracek, 
& Furnham, 2009) but—according to our knowledge—the 
present study is the first study to actually demonstrate that 
informant-ratings of behavior deviate positively from inde-
pendent assessments of “the truth.”
This has several important implications for person assess-
ments in real life: For targets, systematically befriending 
people who might be asked to judge their behavior later on 
(e.g., as members of the board during job applications or as 
reviewers for scientific journals) is likely to pay off in terms 
of obtaining better evaluations. Institutions (e.g., employers, 
scientific journals) that are interested in assessing targets’ 
performances objectively, however, should take care that no 
particularly positive or negative personal relationships exist 
between targets and judges because otherwise the resulting 
judgments might reflect the influence of those relationships 
quite strongly (e.g., the average difference between the infor-
mants’ global evaluations of the behavior of known vs. 
unknown targets was d = .51 in the present study).
An important limitation of our study is that all informants 
were relatively fond of the targets. As a consequence, the 
influence of PEV-GE was probably underestimated due to 
variance restriction (Leising et al., 2010; Peabody & 
Goldberg, 1989). It seems likely that the force of this vari-
able would become stronger when including perceivers who 
differ more in how favorable or critical an image they have 
of their respective targets. With regard to self-ratings, this 
may be achieved by including, for example, participants with 
more negative self-images (e.g., people with elevated levels 
of depression). With such a sample, we would expect global 
evaluation to play an even more prominent role in predicting 
the targets’ judgments of their own behaviors. When infor-
mant-ratings are used, a more realistic estimate of the global 
evaluation effect may be obtained by also recruiting infor-
mants who have no particular loyalties toward, or who even 
dislike, their respective target persons. Such recruitment may 
be challenging, but would clearly be worthwhile at the same 
time, because the resulting samples of targets and perceivers 
would reflect the interpersonal world we inhabit (comprising 
friends and foes, allies and competitors, love interests, loved 
ones and “exes”) more accurately.
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